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IN THE s.UPREME CO·URT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE W. SMITH, 
Plaintiff and AppelZant, 
vs. 
D. W. LOERTSCHER, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
·Case 
No. 9290 
BRIEF O·F RESP·ONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The statement of the case by the appellant ade-
quately reflects the nature of the controversy. We con-
sider it sufficient here to note that the appellant brought 
this action to recover a real estate commission. The 
respondent defended on the grounds that appellant did 
not procure a buyer ready and willing to p·urchase the 
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property, either on the terms set forth in the listing 
agreement (Ex. 1), or on any other terms to which t;he 
respondent agreed. As will be noted in the argument, 
there was a direct conflict in the evidence as to whether 
the prospective buyer, J. Holman Waters, and the re-
spondent reached an agreement on the date of possession. 
Mr. Waters testified that they did, (R. 173, 183). The 
respondent testified that they did not, (R. 203, 208, 225). 
The matter was submitted to the jury on special inter-
rogatories, and the jury found that Mr. Waters and 
respondent did not agree on the terms of a contract, 
(R. 83). The only issues now raised by appellant relate 
to the instructions. 
By way of a cross-assignment of error, respondent 
contends that the court should have granted the respon-
dent's request for a directed verdict, (R. 56). The basis 
for this contention is that the prospective purchaser 
never made a written offer which either met the terms 
of the listing contract or any other terms agreeable to 
the respondent seller. In fact, appellant testified that 
there was never a document even prepared, that either 
or both parties would sign, (R. 150). Respondent con-
firms this, (R. 215). The listing agreement provided 
for payment of a commission if the appellant real estate 
agent found a purchaser ready, '"illing and able to buy 
the property on the terms listed or on any other terms 
to which the respondent seller "agreed", (Ex. 1). The 
only written offer ever secured (dated February 20, 
1959, Ex. 1) did not meet the ter1ns of the listing agree-
ment, (R. 116) and although under the plaintiff's version 
of the testimony, the p-rospective purchaser and seller 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
did reach an oral agreement on the ter1ns of a sale, 
the seller never did sign nor deliver a written offer in 
accordance with the alleged oral agreement. By our 
cross-assignment of error, we contend that the commis-
sion was not earned because such a written offer was 
not secured, and our motion for non-suit (R. 189-190) 
and our request for directed verdict sh~uld have been 
granted. If we are right as to this, an error in the 
instructions, if there were any error, would be immate-
rial. 
We will first endeavor to answer the appellant's 
points, and will then argue our cross-assignment of error. 
STATEMENT OF POIN'TS 
POINT I. 
'THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE SPECIAL INTER--
ROGATORY SUBMITTED TO 'THE JURY. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY 'THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEFEN-
DANT AND WATERS WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY THAT THE WRITTEN OFFER OF FEBRUARY 20TH 
DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE LISTING AGREEMENT. 
POINT IV. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S REFUSAL 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT PLAINTIFF WAS EN-
TITLED TO A COMMISSION IF DEFENDANT CALLED 
THE TRANSACTION OFF. 
POINT V. 
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN SUBMIT-
TING PROPOSITION NO. 2 TO THE JURY. 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT VI. 
THE UTAH CASES HOLD THAT EVEN IF AN IN-
STRUCTION IS EXTRANEOUS, THE VERDICT WILL NOT 
BE REVERSED UNLESS IT IS PREJUDICIAL. 
POINT VII. 
CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. IF THIS COURT 
WERE 'TO HOLD 'THAT THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN ANY OF ·THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN, THE 
JUDGMENT SHOULD NEVERTHELESS BE AFFIRMED, 
BE·CAUSE UNDER THE EVIDENCE THE COURT SHOULD 
HAVE GRANTED DEFENDAN'T'S R·EQUES'T FOR A 
DIRECTED VERDI'CT. 
ARGl.TMENT 
We believe that it will assist the court in analyzing 
the instructions and the points raised by appellant in 
regard thereto if we briefly review the fact issues which 
were presented by the evidence. 
Appellant testified that he had known l\1r. J. Holman 
Waters for about ten or twelve years; and in January 
of 1959 Mr. Waters requested appellant to help hin1 find 
a ranch, (R. 101). The appellant drove to respondent's 
ranch near Park City on February 1±, 1959, and secured 
a listing agreement, (R. 104, Ex. 1). l\Ir. -\Vaters exam-
ined the ranch, (R. 106, 110) and on February 20th 
made a written offer, (R·. 117, Ex. 4). The offer did 
not meet various terms of the listing eontract, and it 
was rejected by respondent, (R. 122, 117). 
The appellant, the respondent and l\Ir. \Vaters then 
discussed the various points " 7herein they differed, (R. 
168) and as a result of this conversation the respondent 
and the appellant went to see respondent's la,Yyer, l\Ir. 
R. J. Hogan, to draw up a new contract. Mr. Water~ 
testified: 
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"I said it would be all right with me to have 
his attorney draw up the contract, as long as I 
could see it and look at it before it was signed 
by either of us." (R. 169). See also R. 180. 
Attorney Hogan, who died prior to the trial, (R. 
126) prepared a draft of a contract, which was intro-
duced in evidence as Ex. 6., (R. 133). The respondent 
picked up the proposed draft from Attorney Hogan and 
without examining it, (R. 201) left a copy with Mr. 
Waters and took another copy home to study it. The 
contract as drafted by Mr. Hogan was not acceptable 
to Mr. Waters, (R. 170). It also was not acceptable to 
Mr. Loertscher, the respondent, (R. 207). 
Thereafter, on a date which Mr. Loertscher says 
was near Easter, (R. 206) the respondent and Mr. Waters 
had another lengthy conversation. Both Mr. Waters 
and respondent indicated that this conversation lasted 
about two and one-half hours; that they started for 
~1r. Hogan's office to keep an appointment; that Mr. 
Waters could see that they were not in agreement, and 
suggested that they have lunch and talk the matter out, 
(R. 207, 171-175). Mr. Waters specifically testified that 
they had reached an oral agree·ment to the effect that 
possession of the ranch would be delivered to Waters 
on l\1ay 1st, but that respondent would be permitted 
to live in the house while he was building his new one, 
(R. 173). Mr. Waters also testified that the parti-es were 
not going to put the date of possession in the contract, 
(R. 183). 
The respondent testified unequivocally that they 
did not agree on the possession date, (R. 208, 211, 228). 
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He also said the contract (Ex. 6) which fixed a May 1st 
possession date, had to be corrected, (R. 225) but he 
never told Attorney Hogan to redraft it, because they 
never did agree on a possession date, (R. 228). 
The primary issue of fact to be determined by 
the jury was whether or not Mr. Waters, the pros-
pective purchaser, and the respondent reached an oral 
understanding concerning the terms of the sale, and in 
particular as to the date of possession. The court sub-
mitted this issue to the jury as a special interrogatory, 
and this brings us to appellant's first point. 
POINT I. 
'THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE SPECIAL INTER-
ROGATORY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
The proposition submitted to the jury, (R. 76, 83) 
was as follows: 
"Proposition No. 1: The defendant, as the 
seller, and J. Holman Waters, the Buyer, reached 
a complete oral or verbal understanding as to 
the price and all other terms and conditions 
under which the defendant 'vould sell and Mr. 
Waters would buy the listed property." 
The jury was instructed to answer this proposition 
"True", "False", or "No preponderance of' the evidence 
either way." The jury answered the proposition "False." 
(R. 83). 
The plaintiff here complains because the trial court 
did not give his requested Instruction No. 5. The pro-
position, as the plaintiff would have had it worded, ,vas 
as follows: 
"Did the defendant, as the seller, and J. 
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Holman Waters, as the Buyer, reach a complete 
oral, or verbal understanding as to the price 
and terms which should be placed in the written 
contract for the sale of the real estate~" 
The proposition requested by plaintiff only asked 
the jury to determine whether the parties had reached 
agreement as to the items which were to be placed ~n 
the written contract for the sale of the property, (R. 52). 
This was not the issue. The sharp conflict in the testi-
mony of Mr. Waters and respondent was related directly 
to the date of possession. As noted above, Mr. Waters 
testified that the parties had agreed on a May 1st pos-
session date, but respondent could continue to use the 
house, (R. 173). More important still-as to this instruc-
tion-Mr. Waters also testified that this was not to be 
placed in the written contract. He said possession was 
to be given: 
"No later than May 1st, to which he Respon-
dent had agreed. That was not to be include1d in 
the sales agree.m.ent. That was something we 
could work out between us .... '' (R. 183) 
Respondent denied that agreement was ever reached 
on a possession date; (R. 208, 211, 218, 228) that the 
contract (Ex. 6-) which fixed possession on May 1st had 
to be corrected, (R. 216); that the re-draft of the con-
tract was never made, because the parties could not 
agree on the possession date, (R. 2'28) and that the deal 
fell apart because Mr. Waters would not yield on this 
point, (R. 216, 235, 218). 
It thus would not have been sufficient merely to have 
the jury answer the question (requested by ap·pellant) 
as to whether the parties had agreed on the things to 
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be put into the written contract. The issue was: Had 
the prospective buyer and the respondent reached an 
oral understanding as to all of the terms under which 
one would buy and the other would sell the property~ 
This is exactly what the court asked the jury, and the 
jury answered that the parties had not reached agree-
ment. 
The plaintiff further contends that a clarifying 
instruction was, in any event, necessary. In this regard 
the ap·p·ellant requested the court by his Request No. 3 
to tell the jury that if the parties had agreed as to all 
matters which "should go into the written contract", 
then ''complete agreement" \vas reached, even though 
other matters were left for future determination. This, 
of course, is not the law. Admittedly, the parties could 
have agreed that the written contract would cover every-
thing but the possession date, and that they would work 
out the possession date, as ~Ir. Waters testified, (R.183). 
If, however, they were unable to agree on the date of 
possession (as the respondent testified), (R. 218, 211, 
228) there would be no agree1nent. In other words, both 
in the proposition proposed by appellant (Request 5, 
R. 52) and in the clarifying instruction, R.equest No. 3, 
the only thing the appellant wanted the jury to deter-
mine was whether the parties had reached an agreen1ent 
as to the things which were to be reduced to '\Vriting. 
Neither the requested proposition nor the requested 
clarifying instruction told the jury that the parties had 
to reach agreement on all the terms under ".,.hich ''T aters 
would buy and plaintiff would sell the property. 
The court did give Instruction 9(g) '\vhich covered 
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lli, 
ll 
in general the subject matter of appellant's Request No. 
3. The jury was told that the parties could reach an 
agreement for the sale of the property without a deter-
mination of how the defendant's housing problem would 
be solved, and that if the jury believed that the parties 
had orally agreed to the terms of the sale, and both had 
intended for it to be drawn up and signed, hut to leave 
for future determination the solution of the housing 
arrangement, they should answer the proposition, 
"True". The court then went on to tell the jury that if 
the parties had not orally agreed when possession would 
be delivered under the proposed contract, they should 
answer the proposition "False". We submit that there 
is no error in this regard. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING 'THE 
JURY THAT THE AGREEMEN'T BETWEEN THE DEFEN-
DAN'T AND WATERS WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE. 
The appellant contends that the trial court should 
not have given Instruction 9 (f) (R. 78), which correctly 
told the jury that under Utah law an agreement to buy 
and sell real estate is not enforceable unless the agree-
ment is in writing and is signed by the party to be bound. 
if. ....~ppellant does not contend that this instruction 
misstated the law. He merely claims that it was irrele-
vant. We submit that this instruction was entirely rele-
vant, and indeed necessary to assist the jury in resolving 
the dispute in the testimony concerning the date of pos-
session. 
Respondent, throughout his testimony, gave as his 
reason for not agreeing to the May 1st possession date 
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the fact that he did not have the ranch sold-nothing 
in writing, and he could not sell his dairy until he knew 
the ranch was sold. For example, at R. 210: 
"Q. And why hadn't you sold your herd in Feb-
ruary or earlier in 1\farch ~ 
A. I couldn't sell, because I didn't have my farm 
sold. I had no firm agreement, no signed 
contract whatsoever, with Mr. Waters. Noth-
ing had been presented to me by Mr. Smith, 
that I could sell my cows knowing that I 
definitely had a sale." 
Then at page 208 he testified: 
''I was milking a large herd of cows, and I 
just couldn't-! depend entirely upon the income 
from these cows for my income, and I just couldn't 
go ahead and dispose of my dairy without defi-
nitely knowing I had a firm contract of sale." 
He then explained the problems of selling a dairy herd 
and Grade A milk base, (R. 209). Appellant's counsel, 
on cross-examination of the respondent, asked at some 
length about offers on the cows, (R. 233). 
All of the witnesses admit that they had reached 
a date near the middle of April, still without a draft of 
a contract which was acceptable to either respondent or 
Mr. Waters. Appellant so testified, (R. 150) and re-
spondent (R. 215) and Mr. Waters (R. 177-8). Since 
the only reason respondent had given for his objection 
to the May 1st date was that he could not sell his dairy 
until he knew the ranch was sold and he could not sell 
a dairy overnight, it was proper for the jury to know 
that oral contracts for the sale of land are not enforce-
able and the reason he was giving 'vas consistent with 
the law. 
10 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NO·T ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY THA'T THE WRITTEN OFFER OF FEBRUARY 20TH 
DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE LISTING AGR.EEMENT. 
The trial court by Instruction 9 (c) (R. 75) told the 
jury that as a matter of law the written offer of Feb-
ruary 20, 1959, did not comply with the listing agree-
ment, and that by securing this offer, Mr. Smith, the 
appellant, had not earned his commission. 
Appellant contends that this was a "red herring"; 
that no contention had been made that the written offer 
of February 20th complied with the listing agreement. 
Again, however, we point out to the court that the 
appellant introduced this written offer into evidence 
as Ex. 4. At the time the offer was made counsel for 
respondent inquired why this document was being p·ut 
in, and the court noted that counsel had already admit-
ted that this offer was at variance with ~the listing 
agreement. ·Counsel for appellant said he wanted to 
get it in for "background", and the court commented 
that this was part of the "path'' which would lead 
the jury to the issue of whether the parties had agreed 
on the terms of a sale, (R. 117). 
There had also been evidence introduced to the 
effect that shortly after the February 20th offer had 
been submitted and before respondent had even talked 
to the appellant about it, respondent overheard Mr. 
Smith talking on the telephone in the lobby of the New-
house Hotel. Respondent testified: 
"I heard Mr. Smith say that he is 'stalling 
for time, that it is a good deal and Holman is 
11 
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ready and willing to buy and I think that I am 
entitled to my commission.' " (R. 195-7) 
There also had been introduced in evidence as Ex. 
7 a second copy of this offer of February 20th (R. 126) 
and nowhere had the jury been told that it was not 
sufficient in law for appellant to get an offer which 
was close to the terms of the listing agreement 
Since these documents had come in evidence as ''back-
ground", it was entirely prop·er for the court to tell the 
jury that this written offer which had been introduced 
in evidence twice and which 1\Ir. Smith thought was a 
"good" deal, and had earned him a commission was not 
effective to do that. 
POINT IV. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S REFUSAL 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THA"T PLAINTIFF WAS EN-
TITLED TO A COMMISSION IF DEFENDANT CALLED 
THE TRANSAGTIO·N OFF. 
Without a general verdict having been submitted 
to the jury, there isn't any way that appellant's Re-
quested Instruction No. 1 would have made sense. It is 
the type of instruction which could only have been given 
had the matter been submitted to the jury for a general 
verdict. It ends up by telling the jury that if it finds 
certain things, "then you should return a verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for 
the sum of $5,000.00." (R. 48). But the court gave the 
jury no form (and app·ellant requested none) by which 
it could have returned a general verdict of $5,000.00. 
The only thing submitted to the jury 'vere the twro 
propositions. The first proposition asked the jury to 
determine whether or not the parties had reached agree-
12 
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ment as to the terms of the sale, and the jury answered, 
~'False", meaning that the parties had not reached agree-
ment. In view of the fact that the matter was being 
submitted on special interrogatories, it would have been 
error to submit this instruction which called for a gen-
eral verdict. No other request was submitted. No other 
exception was taken, (R. 240). The total exception is 
"Plaintiff excepts to the refusal of the court to give his 
Requested Instructions Nos. 1 and 2 .. " Instruction No. 1 
called for a general verdict and could not have been 
given in that form without a general verdict. 
Further in answering the special interrogatory as 
it did-that the parties had not reached an agreement-
the jury has found against appellant on the basic premise 
for this instruction, in any event. 
POINT V. 
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN SUBMIT-
TING PROPOSITION NO. 2 TO THE JURY. 
One of the issues reserved at the pre-trial involved 
the question of whether a wife, who is a co-tenant, must 
sign the listing agreement in order that there be an 
enforceable agreement between the seller and the real 
estate broker, (R. 12). The respondent had testified 
that on the day the appellant got the listing he gave 
the appellant a copy of a tax notice, (Ex. 10) which 
shovved the wife to be a co-owner, (R. 193). The appel-
lant was a real estate agent with 42 years of experience 
and knew it would be necessary to have the wife co-sign 
the deed, (R. 158). It is true that respondent testified 
that he signed the listing and then at the conclusion of 
this particular meeting just as appellant was leaving, 
13 
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the respondent got the tax notice for him, (R. 19'3). 
We do not believe that the mere fact that the signing 
of the listing preceded the delivery of the tax notice 
would have the legal effect of making this a separate 
transaetion. The appellant came to the Loertscher home 
to get a listing. He as ·a p~art of this one visit got the list-
ing and the tax notice. There is one Utah case, to-wit, 
Stewart v. Lesm, 5 Utah 2d 383, 302 P. 2d 714 (1946) 
and a line of cases from other jurisdictions, which 
indicate that knowledge of the wife's ownership and that 
she had not signed would void the agreement. See, for 
example, Gray v. Blake (·Colo.), 283 P. 2d 1078, which 
holds that where a broker knows that he does not have 
a listing agreement from both owners, he can not recover 
his commission. Here the jury was simply asked to 
determine whether Mr. Smith knew that ~frs. Loertscher 
was a co~owner. 
We can not see how this could have in any way 
prejudiced the appellant, even if the law were finally 
resolved to be in harmony with the other line of cases 
which hold that the wife's ownership makes no difference. 
The question became moot when the jury answered the 
first proposition "False". We do not believe that theTe 
was any error in letting the jury ans,Yer this question, 
but even if it were held that the proposition should not 
have been submitted, we can not see how the app·ellant 
possibly could have been prejudiced thereby. 
POINT VI. 
'THE UTAH CASES HOLD THAT EVEN IF AN IN-
STRUCTION IS EXTRANEOUS, THE VERDICT WILL NOT 
BE REVERSED UNLESS IT IS PREJUDICIAL. 
14 
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We will not prolong this brief by discussing this 
in detail. The problem is discussed in Moore v. Denver 
& R~o Grande Western RR., (1956), 4 Ut. 2d 255, 292 
P. 2d 849; Lemmon v. Denver & R~o Grande Western 
RR., (1959), 9 Ut. 2d 195, 341 P. 2d 215; Bruner v. 
McCarthy, (1943), 105 Ut. 399, 142 P. 2d 649·. The court 
in these cases clearly lays down the rule that although 
an instruction might have been better omitted, a case 
will not be reversed unless there is a real showing of 
prejudice to the complaining party. 
POINT VII. 
CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. IF THIS COURT 
WERE T·O HO·LD 'T'HAT THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN ANY OF 'THE INS'TRUCTIONS GIVEN, THE 
JUDGMENT SHOULD NEVERTHELESS BE AFFIRMED, 
BECAUSE UNDER THE EVIDENCE THE COURT SHOULD 
HAVE GRANTED DEFENDAN'T'S REQUEST FOR A 
DIRECTED VERDICT. 
'The court should have directed a verdict, because 
it is clear from the evidence that no written offer to 
purchase on the listed terms or on other terms agreed 
to by respondent was ever secured by the real estate 
agent. It is also clear that respondent did not agree 
in writing to any other terms than those listed. 
It is clear from the evidence that Mr. Waters never 
signed any written offer except the offer of February 
20th. In fact, both the appellant (R. 150) and the re-
spondent (R. 215) testified expressly that there was 
never a contract drafted at any stage in these negotia-
tions which was acceptable to either party. We believe 
that the real estate commission could only be earne-d 
under the listing agreement by either (a) presenting 
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a written offer to purchase in accordance with the listed 
terms, or by (b) presenting a written offer to purchase 
on other terms agreeable to the respondent. See Lewis 
v. Dahl (1945), 108 Utah 486, 161 P. 2d 362. 
That case involved a suit by a real estate agent for 
his commission. The agreement there provided that if 
the property were sold by anybody during the term 
of the listing contract the broker would get his com-
mission. The evidence disclosed some arrangement be-
tween the seller and the ultimate buyer made prior to 
the expiration of the listing agreement, but the deed of 
conveyance was dated after the listing expired: The 
question the court decided was : "When does a sale 
take place~'' The court said : 
''We are of the opinion, for reasons more 
fully disclosed hereinafter, that the word 'sale' 
in a real estate broker's listing contract~ which 
renders the owner liable for payment of a com-
mission in the event the owner himself makes a 
sale during the term of the listing, means the 
conveyance of title to ~the purchaser for a valuable 
consideration consisting of the p·urchase price, 
or the execution and delivery of a valid and 
enforceable contract of sale \\"'"hereby some estate 
in the land, legal or equitable, passes to the pur-
chaser. Ad·mittedly, i.f the broker presents only 
an oral offer to purchase, he is not entitled to 
a commission ~tntil or unless that offer is put in 
wr~t'ing and the owner has a duty to accept snch 
offer under the terms o .f the listing, or unless olf' 
until such t·ransactio11 is consunzn1ated; for no 
on,e is bound by a mere oral offer. If the o:-wner 
enters into an oral agreement to sell 'Yhich is not 
consummated by payment of the purchase price 
and delivery of the deed or by execution of a 
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binding contract of sale, there is no assurarnce 
that the owner will ever collect the purchase price. 
Until the owner recetves ~a written offer or a 
written acceptance which he can enforoe as a 
valvd and binding contract, or until there is a 
sale tvhich is recognvzed by the statute of fr.awds, 
there ~s no sale within the meantng of the above 
quoted provision in the broker's liJsting contract." 
(emphasis added). 
See also Curtis v. Mortensen, 1 Utah 2·d 354, 267 
P. 2d 237 ( 1954) . The court recognized that it had 
heretofore held that the broker must procure a legally 
enforceable written offer, which meets the terms of the 
listing con trac;t or other terms to which the seller has 
agreed. In that case the offer was oral, hut the buyer 
had brought a suit for specific performance of the seller's 
written offer, and the court held that this was tantamount 
to a written offer, and that the purchasers "just as 
effectively offered to buy the property" by bringing the 
action for specific performance as "they could have 
offered by signing a binding agreement." These two 
cases should be conclusive on this point. 
If a real estate agent could earn his commiSSion 
simply by finding somebody who would orally say that 
at a particular moment he was ready, willing and able 
to buy the property on the listed terms, the seller could 
really be hurt. If appellant's theory here is correct, his 
commission would be earned at that point, because he 
found somebody who would orally agree to buy the land 
at the listed terms. Then two or three weeks later the 
prospective purchaser could say, "I was ready, willing 
and able on April 1st, but now when the time has come 
for me to sign I have changed my mind and am no longer 
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willing." The cases seem to be rather uniform in holding 
that this is not enough. 
It should also be noted that Section 25-5-4, U.C.A. 
1953, requires the lisiting agreement itself to be in 
writing before the agent can recover his commission. 
It is also provided by the general statute of frauds 
(Section 25-5-1) that a contract to convey an interest 
in real estate must be written and signed. The listing 
agreement in this case was prepared for the appellant. 
If it is ambiguous, it must be construed against him. 
If he had secured a written offer to buy at the listed price 
and on the listed terms, he, of course, would have earned 
his commission and would have been entitled to payment 
even though the seller declined to sell. See, for example, 
Little v. Fle~shman, 35 Ut. 566, 101 P. 984 and Ogden 
Savings TrttSt Co. v. Blakely, 66 Ut. 229, 241 P. 221 
(1925). But this did not happen here, and the appellant 
must base his claim in this case on the contention that 
he secured a buyer who had reached an "agreement" 
with seller on other terms. We believe that as a matter 
of law this ''agreement" to terms other than those listed 
must be legally enforceable or the commission is not 
earned. 
The seller can not be held to have ''agreed" to some 
terms other than those listed, if the seller's alleged 
"agreement" is only oral. The rationale of this line 
of cases is that to hold in the first instance that the real 
estate agent's listing agreement n1ust be ,, ... ritten, and 
then to hold that the agent can collect his commission 
for procuring an offer to buy on some other terms (other 
than those listed) on ~testimony that the seller had orallv 
ol 
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agreed to terms different from the written listing would 
be nonsense. This is elaborately discussed in Roseberry 
v. Heckler, (Arizona 1958), 326 P. 2d 365, and in Augus-
t~'lne v. Trucco, 268 P. 2d 780, (Calif. 1954). 
Two short quotes from these may suffice. In the 
first case, the Arizona court said : 
''We are constrained to hold that proof of 
other acceptable terms can not he made by testi-
mony of oral statements only that the owner 
has agreed or will agree to such terms. Much 
evil which was in1tended to be prevented by Sec-
tion 44-101 supra, [which requires real estate 
agent's agreements to be written] potentially 
could result from permitting this class of oral 
f " proo .... 
In the Augustine case the court said : 
"No more backward step could be taken by 
the courts than to countenance an action for a 
broker's commission founded on an alleged state-
ment of an owner, perhaps over the telephone, 
that he would accept less for his p·roperty than 
the price stipulated in the broker's written con-
tract of employmen,t. The security which the 
writing affords the parties would be taken from 
the very heart of the agreement, and there would 
be no protection against fraud and perjury." 
We believe that this is a sound rule. I't was squarely 
raised here by the motion for a non-suit (R. 92) and 
by the request for a directed verdict (R. 56). It is adinit-
ted by everyone that the only written offer secured 
(Ex. 1) did not meet the terms of the listing agreement, 
(R. 117). No other written offer which the respondent 
seller could have accepted was ever secured, and respon-
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dent never was in a position where he could have accepted 
and legally bound Mr. Waters to buy· on any other teTins. 
In fact no agreement acceptable to the parties was ever 
prepared, (R. 150). The cases cited above hold that this 
is fatally defective to the plaintiff's case. 
Further, we submit that the language of the list-
ing agreement (Ex. 1) which obligates payment of the 
commission if appellant finds a buyer willing to buy the 
property at the listed price and on the listed terms 
"or at any olJher price or terms to which I o·r we may 
agree" means legally ''agree"; that the Arizona and 
California cases cited above correctly state the law; 
and that it is not competent merely to prove that the 
seller orally agreed to terms other than those listed. 
What possible sense could there be in our statute of 
frauds requiring that the real estate listing agreement 
be written, if after procuring a written listing setting 
forth the specific teTins, the broker can then force the 
payment of a commission by showing that the seller 
orally agreed to teTins different from those listed~ If 
such were the law, the sta~tute of fraud provision would 
be useless. 
Thus, on two grounds the plaintiff can not prevail 
as a matter of law. First, he never procured a written 
offer either (a) in accordance with the listing agreement, 
or (b) in accordance with the alleged oral agreement 
from the seller to accept other terms. Secondly, in the 
face of a statute requiring a listing agreement to be 
written, the agent ought not to be per1nitted to collect 
a commission by proof that the seller orally agreed to 
terms different from those listed in the "Titing. 
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If we are right in this regard, then no instructions 
should have been given. The verdict should have been 
directed or the non-suit granted, and if there were any 
prejudicial error in the instructions as given, this would 
be immaterial. 
CONCL·USION 
It is respectfully submitted that this is a case where 
there is direct and sharp conflict in the evidence on the 
issue of possession. That issue was submitted to the 
jury, and the jury found in favor of the defendant. The 
clarifying instructions were all of assistance to the 
jury, but even if appellant were correet that some were 
extraneous, there could still have been no prejudice 
therefrom. Finally, the plaintiff as a matter of law 
must fail because he never procured a written offer 
either in accordance with the alleged oral agreement, 
nor wi~th the terms of the listing and in addition he 
should not in the face of a statute requiring a listing 
agreement to be written be permitted to show an oral 
agreement to different terms. The judgmen~t should be 
affirmed and respondent should be awarded his costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
Attorney for Respondent 
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